A s companies continue to make large investments in information technology (IT), questions about how and in what contexts such investments pay off have gained importance. We develop a theoretical framework to explain how IT investments could pay off in the economically significant context of corporate diversification, and empirically find that the performance pay off to IT investments is greater for firms with greater levels of diversification. We also find that the performance payoff to IT investments is greater in related diversification than in unrelated diversification.
Introduction
Investment in information technology (IT) and implications for firm performance are central issues in the IT payoff literature (see Melville et al. 2004 for a review) . Although several studies have demonstrated payoffs to investing in IT (Anderson et al. 2006 , Bharadwaj et al. 1999 , Dos Santos et al. 1993 , Im et al. 2001 , Mukhopadhyay et al. 1997 ), further research is needed to understand how and why these investments affect performance (Sambamurthy et al. 2003) and the contexts and conditions under which IT investment will have a beneficial impact (Clemons and Row 1991 , Li and Ye 1999 , Melville et al. 2004 , Powell and Dent-Micallef 1997 .
We examine the performance impact of IT investment in the context of corporate diversification, where firms own and operate businesses in multiple industries. Diversified corporations are significant consumers of IT investments (Dewan et al. 1998) . Furthermore, these corporations are critical players in the economy accounting for a significant portion of economic activity in the United States and other countries (Montgomery 1994) . 1 The question of whether IT investments pay off in the context of corporate diversification is therefore economically very significant.
Our study contributes to the IT payoff literature in four ways. First, economic significance of IT investments has long been a key motivation for studying IT payoffs , Loveman 1994 , Morrison 1997 . Our study helps us understand the performance impact of IT investments in an economically significant context that has not been studied in extant research. Second, authors have observed that "theoretical frameworks are yet to explain how and why these [IT] investments enhance firm performance" (Sambamurthy et al. 2003, p. 238) . We address this call by developing a theoretical framework for IT payoff in the context of corporate diversification. Our framework draws from the literature on economies of scope and coordination and control to explain IT payoff in diversification as stemming from two sources: (1) greater returns from sharing and transferring IT assets across businesses, and (2) from facilitating coordination and control required to realize potential economies of scope in various assets and capabilities.
Third, the IT payoff literature has pointed out that examining IT payoff without adequate fidelity has contributed to conflicting results, which slows down cumulative knowledge building (Alpar and Kim 1990, Brynjolfsson and . Similarly, literature reviews and meta-analysis of IT-payoff studies have observed that conflicting and inconsistent findings are also attributable to alternative specifications and measures used in different studies , Kohli and Devaraj 2003 , Mahmood and Mann 2000 . We control for a variety of known extraneous influences on firm performance to ensure greater fidelity in our analyses (Jarvenpaa et al. 1985) , and perform extensive robustness checks using alternative measures and specifications to enhance the contribution of our findings to knowledge accumulation on IT payoffs. Fourth, our study contributes to the cross-fertilization of information systems (IS) research with research in other disciplines to address questions important to both IS scholars and those in other disciplines, as urged by authors studying IS as a reference discipline (Baskerville and Myers 2002) . Specifically, our study brings together the IT payoff literature and the strategic management literature to address the question of IT payoff in diversification. Our findings also contribute to the strategic management literature because the performance consequence of IT investment in diversification has not been empirically tested in the extant strategy literature, even though strategy scholars have recognized the potential role of IT for coordination within diversified firms Jones 2007, Jones and Hill 1988) .
Literature Review
Early IT payoff literature sought to establish a direct link between IT investment and performance, but did not find consistent support for the relationship. The ensuing research has led to a growing consensus that competitive imitation and widespread IT adoption have rendered direct payoffs to IT investment unlikely (Clemons and Row 1991, Vitale 1986 ). Instead, the emerging consensus in the literature is that IT investment payoffs are contingent on the presence of complementary factors or contexts (Clemons and Row 1991 , Powell and Dent-Micallef 1997 , Weill and Aral 2006 . Powell and Dent-Micallef (1997) , for example, showed that IT in itself did not enhance performance, but that it could improve performance by leveraging complementary human and business resources. Similarly, others have shown a positive performance impact for IT when it confers first-mover advantages (Dos Santos and Peffers 1995) and when it is aligned with certain business strategies (Sabherwal and Chan 2001) .
We extend this line of research by studying the performance impact of IT investment in the context of corporate diversification strategy. Corporate diversification strategy involves the pursuit of superior performance through the configuration and coordination of activities across multiple businesses of a corporation (Collis and Montgomery 1997) . Economic rationale for corporate diversification (also simply referred to as diversification) strategy exists when common ownership and operation of multiple businesses allow a diversified firm to achieve greater performance than that obtained by merely adding together the performance of these business had they been owned and operated independently (Porter 1987) . The superior performance in diversification strategy is expected from economies of scope where a firm earns a greater return on its investments by sharing and leveraging assets and capabilities resulting from its investments across multiple businesses (Teece 1982) . Gains from economies of scope, however, will not be realized if the firm cannot effectively coordinate and control the interbusiness dependencies and activities required for sharing and leveraging assets and capabilities, i.e., implement the diversification strategy (Jones and Hill 1988) .
The strategy literature describes two types of diversification-related and unrelated. Related diversification involves operating businesses in industries that are related to each other and, therefore, offers opportunities to share operating assets and capabilities as well as financial resources. Unrelated diversification involves operating businesses in industries not related to each other and, consequently, presents opportunities to share financial resources and a relatively limited set of opportunities to share operating assets and capabilities (Jones and Hill 1988) . Although related diversification offers the chance to share more resources, implementing related diversification also involves greater coordination and control (Jones and Hill 1988) .
Based on the coordination demands of diversification strategies, Dewan et al. (1998) examined IT investments in diversified firms and found that diversified firms invested more in IT, with related diversifiers investing more than unrelated diversifiers. Combining the Dewan et al. (1998) findings with studies that have explored a direct performance effect for IT investment (e.g., Bharadwaj et al. 1999 ) suggests a mediation model for the performance impact of IT in diversification, where diversification enhances IT investment and this increased IT investment in INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
turn enhances firm performance. However, as the evolving consensus in the IT payoff literature indicates, IT investment by itself is not likely to enhance firm performance and, therefore, the relationship between increased IT investment and firm performance also seems unlikely. In addition, a performance impact for IT investment in diversification is also likely from sharing and transferring IT assets across businesses (Clemons and Row 1991) , and this performance impact from economies of scope in IT investment is not captured by the mediation model. For these reasons, the mediation model is an unlikely explanation.
2 However, given the significant role of IT in facilitating coordination (Dewan et al. 1998 ) and the opportunities for IT asset sharing in diversified firms (Clemons and Row 1991) , it is quite likely that a diversification strategy represents a complementary context that cocreates value for IT investment-value that can be empirically detected as a joint effect on firm performance. Boal and Bryson (1987) present two related but distinct models to represent complementary relationships: (1) the familiar moderating effects model, where a direct relationship between one of the complementary variables and the outcome variable is moderated by the other complementary variable (for example, diversification moderating the relationship between IT investment and performance), and (2) an alternate interaction model, where the complementary variables are expected to affect the outcome variable jointly and no direct effects are postulated. We have noted the evolving consensus in the IT payoff literature that emphasizes the contextual nature of IT payoffs rather than direct performance effects for IT investment. There is a similar movement in the strategy literature away from expecting a direct performance effect for diversification strategy, to a more nuanced position where the performance effect is expected to be contingent on developing coordination and control capabilities required for implementing diversification strategy (Hill et al. 1992 ). The evolving literatures in both IT payoff and diversification strategy are therefore consistent with the interaction model, where the focus is on the interaction effect (i.e., joint effect) between IT investment and diversification strategy, and no direct effect for either IT investment or diversification is postulated.
Hypothesis Development
In this section we develop our argument that IT investment will have a significant performance effect in diversification strategy from two sources. First, economies of scope from sharing IT assets and capabilities across businesses will lead to a greater return on IT investment. Second, IT investment will have a performance effect by enabling the coordination and control of interbusiness dependencies and activities required to realize economies of scope from sharing various assets and capabilities, not just IT. We apply these arguments to two aspects of diversification strategy: (1) the level of diversification (extent to which a firm's activities are spread across multiple businesses) and (2) the type of diversification (related versus unrelated diversification).
Greater Returns from Sharing and
Transferring IT Assets and Capabilities The main source of superior performance in diversification is economies of scope. Although the focus of extant diversification strategy literature has been on economies of scope from sharing research and development (R&D), marketing, and financial resources, given the large and growing size of IT investment in firms, 3 gains from sharing IT assets and capabilities in diversified firms are likely to be substantial. Clemons and Row (1991) discuss three avenues by which IT asset sharing can generate greater returns for IT investment in diversification strategy. First, Clemons and Row (1991) argue that using the same IT asset to support the needs of multiple businesses can yield scale advantages in key IT resources. To the extent that activities of multiple businesses are similar, a diversified firm may be able to develop an IT system that can be utilized by its multiple businesses. Clemons and Row (1991) provide the centralized procurement system used by multiple businesses within Hewlett Packard as an example. A second avenue to leverage IT investment across businesses is through the transfer of technologies across businesses, where the IT capabilities or know-how developed in one business is transferred and applied to another business to create a new IT system (Clemons and Row 1991) . Such transfer of existing know-how allows the firm to create the new system faster and less expensively than if it were developed independently, thereby creating a greater return on its IT investment (Markides and Williamson 1994) . Exploiting new uses for existing IT assets is the third avenue discussed by Clemons and Row (1991) for generating greater returns on IT investment in diversification. As an example, Amazon.com's diversification into the e-commerce services business, through which Amazon offers its technological expertise to third parties such as Target and Toys RUs on a turnkey basis, has opened a new avenue for the company to deploy its sophisticated e-commerce systems and capabilities, and thereby increase returns on its original investments in these technologies (Banham 2004) . Because greater levels of diversification present opportunities for sharing and transferring IT assets and capabilities across more businesses, the economies of scope in IT investment and the resulting performance impact for IT investment are likely to be greater in morediversified firms.
The economies of scope in IT investment are also likely to depend on the type of diversification. Because economies of scope in diversification arise from cost savings obtained when assets are shared between businesses or when assets developed in one business are deployed in another, the size of gains from sharing and transferring an asset is a function of the cost of modifying it for use across the businesses (Teece 1982) . The cost of modifying an asset can be understood as imposing an efficiency loss associated with deploying an asset developed in one business to another, and Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) show that efficiency losses are greater when assets are deployed across unrelated industries than when deployed across related industries. Montgomery and Wernerfelt's (1988) findings suggest that applying IT assets to businesses in similar industries is likely to involve fewer modifications and, therefore, incur lower efficiency losses than applying them to businesses in dissimilar industries. Consequently, the economies of scope gains from sharing and transferring IT assets and capabilities are likely to be greater in related diversification than in unrelated diversification.
Payoff from Enabling Coordination
and Control Although potential gains from sharing various assets and capabilities including IT assets may be large, superior performance from diversification is not automatic, but will depend on the effective coordination and control of interbusiness dependencies and activities required to implement the strategy. Effective coordination involves processing, sharing, and communicating information as needed across various business units, and control involves monitoring and evaluating performance to overcome agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 1992) . Providing coordination and control can be both complex and information intensive (Hill and Hoskisson 1987) . IT-enabled systems such as ERP (enterprise resource planning), CRM (customer relationship management), and EAI (enterprise applications integration) can allow corporate managers to gain the necessary information in a quick, reliable, and consistent format for decision making (Hill and Jones 2007) , and thereby help unlock the potential performance advantages of diversification (Jones and Hill 1988) . Because greater levels of diversification increase the number of businesses that need to be coordinated and controlled, the need for and, consequently, the benefits from IT-enabled coordination and control are likely to be greater in firms with greater levels of diversification.
The need for and the benefits from IT-enabled coordination and control are also likely to depend on the type of diversification. As Dewan et al. (1998) argued, coordination and control required to implement related diversification, compared with unrelated diversification, are much more complex and information-processing intensive, and therefore require greater reliance on IT-conferred capabilities. First, transferring and sharing operating assets and capabilities across related businesses requires coordinating reciprocal interdependencies between the businesses, which are more complex and information-processing intensive than coordinating the pooled interdependencies required to share financial resources (Hill and Hoskisson 1987 , Jones and Hill 1988 , Thompson 1967 . Second, implementing related diversification requires more complex control systems and, therefore, greater reliance on IT than implementing unrelated diversification. In related diversified firms, monitoring and evaluating performance is complex because of difficulties in identifying, measuring, and rewarding the relative contributions of interdependent business units; managers must therefore gather and process greater amounts of information and do so more frequently to exercise effective control (Jones and Hill 1988) . In unrelated diversified firms, in the absence of reciprocal interdependencies between businesses, corporate managers need only process information specific to each autonomous, unrelated division; managers can rely on periodically obtained objective financial criteria that are tied to financial incentives to exercise effective control (Jones and Hill 1988) .
Consistent with this greater importance of ITconferred capabilities for coordinating and controlling related diversification, Dewan et al. (1998) found that related diversified firms invested more on IT than unrelated diversified firms. We argue that the greater importance of IT in related diversification also reflects greater complementary value for IT investments in related diversification. Complementarities among factors arise when the value of one factor is enhanced by the presence of another factor (Barua et al. 1996) . As a complementary factor, IT investment facilitates the development of sophisticated information processing and coordination capabilities critical to unlocking the benefits of related diversification, thereby contributing to firm performance.
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The lower complexity and information-processing needs in unrelated diversification suggest that simpler information-processing mechanisms such as periodic meetings and reviews may be quite effective for the task, rendering IT-conferred coordination and control capabilities less important (Galbraith 1974) . Consequently, IT investments are not likely to hold as high a complementary value in unrelated diversification as they do in related diversification.
Hypotheses
In summary, we have developed arguments that IT investment will have a performance effect in diversification strategy from two sources: (1) economies of scope from sharing IT across multiple businesses, (2) enabling the coordination and control required to realize economies of scope in various assets, not just IT. These arguments are applied to two aspects of diversification strategy: (1) the level of diversification and (2) the type of diversification.
With regard to the level of diversification, we have noted that firms with higher levels of diversification have opportunities for sharing IT assets and capabilities across more businesses and, therefore, are likely to obtain a greater return on IT investment. Furthermore, because more businesses need to be coordinated and controlled in more-diversified firms, the benefits of IT-enabled coordination and control are also likely to be greater in more-diversified firms. For these reasons, firms with higher levels of diversification are likely to obtain a greater performance impact from IT investment.
Hypothesis 1. The impact of IT investment on firm performance will be greater for firms with greater levels of diversification.
With respect to the type of diversification, we have noted that, because sharing and transferring IT assets and capabilities across related businesses, compared with unrelated businesses, are likely to involve lower efficiency losses, the economies of scope in IT investment are likely to be greater in related diversification than in unrelated diversification. Furthermore, because coordination and control required in related diversification are much more complex and information-processing intensive, the need for and the benefits from IT-enabled coordination and control are likely to be greater in related diversification than in unrelated diversification. For these reasons, the performance impact of IT investment is likely to be greater in related diversification than in unrelated diversification.
Hypothesis 2. The impact of IT investment on firm performance will be greater in related diversification than in unrelated diversification.
Sample and Variables Used in the Study
We followed prior research (Bharadwaj et al. 1999) and obtained IT investment data from annual IT surveys reported in the publication Information Week. Specifically, we use Information Week's IW500 data for 1997, the most recent year for which these data are available. Data for other variables of interest were also collected for the same year from various sources. After excluding private firms and those for which data on other required variables could not be obtained, a total of 117 firms remained in the sample. The sample firms are comparable in size to the set of S&P 500 firms. Firms in the sample had average sales of $9.42 billion, employed an average of 47 900 employees, and obtained 22.3% of their sales from foreign markets. In addition, about 65% of the firms were from the manufacturing sector and the rest were from other sectors including retail, wholesale, transportation, communication, and other services. Firm performance, the dependent variable, was measured as Tobin's q (computed following Chung and Pruitt 1994) . Specifically, the measure was computed as a ratio of market value [(fiscal year-end market value of equity) + (liquidating value of the firms' outstanding preferred stock) + (current liabilities) − (current assets) + (book value of inventories) + (long-term debt)] to book value of total assets. Tobin's q incorporates a market-based measure of firm value, which is forward looking, risk adjusted, and less vulnerable to changes in accounting practices and, hence, is considered appropriate for measuring the performance impact of IT investments (Bharadwaj et al. 1999 ). Tobin's q has also been advocated as the appropriate measure for studying the performance consequences of diversification strategies (Montgomery 1994, Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988) . Montgomery (1994) , for example, observes that, because marginal rents to diversification may be favorable even when average rents are not, average accounting returns may decline even when diversification increases a firm's economic value, which a market-based measure such as Tobin's q captures. Data for computing Tobin's q were obtained from Compustat.
The two main independent variables in this study are IT investment and diversification. Following Bharadwaj et al. (1999) , IT investment was measured as the ratio of dollar investment in IT (obtained from Information Week) to sales (obtained from Compustat). Diversification was computed using an entropy measure with data obtained from Compustat (Palepu 1985) . The entropy measure is widely used in the strategy literature and was also the measure of diversification in Dewan et al. (1998) . Details on the construction of the measure for related, unrelated and INFORMS holds copyright to this article and distributed this copy as a courtesy to the author(s).
total diversification can be found in the study by Dewan et al. (1998, pp. 230-231) . Briefly, related diversification (RD) measures the extent of a firm's operations in different industries within the same two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code. Unrelated diversification (UD) measures the extent of a firm's operations in different two-digit SIC codes. Total diversification (TD) measures the extent of a firm's operations in different industries, whether related or unrelated, and is equal to the sum of the two diversification measures-RD and UD.
We controlled for several industry-level variables (industry capital intensity, market uncertainty, market growth, industry concentration, and industry performance) and firm-level variables (firm size, capital structure, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, and market share) that may affect firm performance to rule out alternative explanations and enhance the fidelity with which the relationships of interest are examined (Dess et al. 1990 , Jarvenpaa et al. 1985 . The measures used for the industry-level and firm-level control variables, along with references to the prior research from which they were adopted, are listed in the appendix.
Capital intensity is an indicator of exit barriers and it has been argued that firms will assume the risks associated with sunk investments only when the promise of firm performance is high (Bettis 1981) . Consequently, the association between capital intensity and performance is expected to be positive (Robins and Wiersema 1995) . Market uncertainty disrupts the effectiveness of existing strategies and increases the information-processing requirements, thus, negatively impacting firm performance (Bergh 1998, Hill and Hoskisson 1987) . Market growth, on the other hand, Table 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Notes. Correlations ±0 19 or larger are significant at p < 0 05 (two-tailed). Correlations ±0 24 or larger are significant at p < 0 01 (two-tailed). s.d., Standard deviation. IT * TD is the interaction term for centered IT investment and centered total diversification. IT * RD is the interaction term for centered IT investment and centered related diversification. IT * UD is the interaction term for centered IT investment and centered unrelated diversification.
reduces competitive rivalry and, consequently, has a positive impact on firm performance (Porter 1979) . Industry concentration has been shown to have a negative effect on firm performance in studies of IT investment as well as diversification (Bharadwaj et al. 1999, Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988) . We include an additional variable, industry performance, to control for aspects of the industry that are not captured by capital intensity, market uncertainty, market growth, and concentration. Firm size is associated with economies of scale and, hence, is expected to have a positive association with firm performance (Hitt et al. 1997) . R&D intensity and advertisement intensity have been argued to indicate research and marketing capabilities, respectively, and have been shown to have a positive influence on firm performance (Capon et al. 1990 , Kotabe et al. 2002 . Firms often do not report R&D and advertising expenses if these values are not deemed "material"; we followed prior research (see Bharadwaj et al. 1999 Bharadwaj et al. , p. 1016 and replaced missing values with zeros. In addition, we ran our analyses without these two variables and found that our results did not change.
Market share is argued to indicate market power and provide scale benefits, and has been shown to have a positive impact on firm performance (Capon et al. 1990) . Similarly, prior work has empirically shown that a firm's capital structure (debt in particular) has a negative effect on firm performance (Hitt et al. 1997 ). for market uncertainty, market growth, and other control variables used in this study (Bergh 1998 , Bharadwaj et al. 1999 , Hitt et al. 1997 , Keats and Hitt 1988 .
Analysis and Results
To avoid multicollinearity problems that are likely in regression models with interaction effects, we centered the independent variables of interest as suggested by Aiken and West (1991) . In addition, we ran a battery of tests recommended by Hair et al. (1998), and Belsley et al. (1980) to examine if our results are affected by multicollinearity. Specifically, we examined the variance inflation factors (VIFs) and tolerance values, and conducted the two-stage process recommended by Belsley et al. (1980) . The VIFs were well below the threshold value of 10 or greater, which is indicative of multicollinearity (none of our VIFs were above 2.519), and the tolerance values were well above the suggested 0.10 or less threshold (our tolerance values were 0.397 or greater), which is indicative of multicollinearity (Belsley et al. 1980 , Hair et al. 1998 ). The two-stage process recommended by Belsley et al. (1980) also did not indicate that multicollinearity is a problem that affects our results. We also conducted tests to assess normality and constant variance assumptions. The Kolomogorov-Smirnov test for normality did not indicate deviations from normality, whereas White's test for heteroscedascity supported the constant variance assumption.
Our hypotheses pertain to the interaction effects, i.e., the joint effects of IT investment (IT) and diversification (TD, RD, and UD) on firm performance Q . Our approach to testing interaction effects follows the procedure outlined by Aiken and West (1991) . The predicted value Q can be written as:
If B 3 is zero, then we must conclude that the regression of Q on IT is independent of the level of TD. If B 3 is significantly greater than zero, then we can conclude that the regression of Q on IT depends on the level of TD. Our Hypothesis 1 predicts that B 3 is significantly greater than zero. Using the two types of diversification, RD and UD, instead of total diversification, the above equation can be rewritten as follows and our Hypothesis 2 predicts that B 4 will be greater than B 5 in this disaggregated model. Table 2 presents the results of regression analyses. The F statistic for the models using the total diversification level (Models 1 and 2) and the ones using related and unrelated diversification (Models 3 and 4) are significant, and the changes in R 2 when the interaction term(s) are added are also significant. The interaction term between IT investment and total diversification (Model 2) is positive and significant, supporting Hypothesis 1. In Model 4, the interaction term for related diversification is significant and positive, but the one for unrelated diversification is not significant. A t test for the difference between the coefficients for the two interaction terms performed as outlined by Wooldridge (2003, pp. 139-142) shows that the difference is significant p < 0 042 , supporting Hypothesis 2.
R&D intensity
Several control variables (industry performance, industry capital intensity, firm size, capital structure, market uncertainty, and advertising intensity) are significant in the expected direction. The coefficient for IT is significant in Model 2, but is not significant in Model 4. The coefficients for the diversification variables are Model 11 controls for industry performance by subtracting industry average q from the dependent variable. Models 12 and 13 use data for 1995 and 1996, respectively (instead of 1997) . The number of observations N for the robustness test models varied from a low of 107 to a high of 126 due to data availability. not significant in Models 2 and 4. These coefficients should be interpreted with caution because they do not represent constant effects. Rather, they represent the conditional effects of the variables at the mean(s) of the variable(s) with which they interact (Aiken and West 1991) . Thus, the positive and significant coefficient for IT in Model 2 represents the conditional effect of IT on firm performance when total diversification is at its mean. The positive but insignificant coefficient for IT in Model 4 represents the conditional effect of IT on firm performance when both related diversification and unrelated diversification are at their respective means. We speculate that the insignificant coefficient for IT in Model 4 is because this represents the conditional effect for IT at the mean level of unrelated diversification (and also related diversification) when, as our results show, unrelated diversification has no effect on the performance impact of IT. In Model 2, in contrast, where the IT coefficient represents the conditional effect at the mean of the observed total diversification values, regardless of their composition in terms of related and unrelated diversification, the insignificant effect of unrelated diversification, it appears, is drowned out and dominated by the significant effect of related diversification.
Similarly, the insignificant coefficients for the diversification variables show that diversification does not have a performance effect when IT investment is at its mean. The positive and significant interaction effects for IT with total diversification and related diversification, however, suggest that the performance impact of such diversification increases with greater IT investment, supporting the contention in the strategy literature that adopting sophisticated coordination and control mechanisms is important for realizing performance gains from diversification strategy (Hill et al. 1992 , Hill and Hoskisson 1987 , Jones and Hill 1988 .
Robustness of Results
We examined the robustness of our results to using alternative measures and specifications. Table 3 presents results of these robustness tests for the model using the two disaggregated diversification measures. 4 Model 5 utilizes an alternative measure of IT investment, IT investment per employee rather than IT investment per dollar of sales. Acar and Sankaran (1999) have argued that, while entropy measures are popular in strategic management research, Herfindahl measures enjoy certain properties which make them useful alternatives. We therefore ran Model 6 utilizing Herfindahl measures of related and unrelated diversification. Model 7 utilizes IT investment stock as the IT investment variable using the Dewan et al. (1998) approach of assuming that IT expenses create assets with a service life of three years and using IT investment data for the three years 1995 through 1997 to create a proxy for IT investment stock. Model 8 reports results using an instrumental variable approach to address potential endogeneity/simultaneity of key variables. Following Lev and Sougiannis's (1996) approach, we use the respective industry averages to create instruments for IT investment and related and unrelated diversification. Wu-Hausman tests indicate that ordinary least-squares regression coefficients are appropriate (Wooldridge 2003) . Model 9 includes a control for vertical integration. Model 10 uses Tobin's q for 1998 instead of 1997 to examine lagged performance effects. Model 11 utilizes an alternative way to control for industry performance; in this model we subtract the industry average Tobin's q from the dependent variable and exclude the industry performance control used in the other models. Models 12 and 13 utilize data for the years 1995 and 1996, respectively, to examine the robustness of our results across time. The results for the robustness tests, including the significance of the interaction terms, are consistent with our original results, confirming the robustness of our results across these alternative models.
Discussion
In this note, we examined the performance payoff to IT investment in the context of corporate diversification. We find that the performance impact of IT investment is greater for firms with greater levels of diversification. We also find that the performance impact of IT investment is greater in related diversification than in unrelated diversification, reflecting the greater economies of scope for IT investment and the greater importance of IT-enabled coordination and control in related diversification. In fact, our results show that the performance impact of IT investment did not increase with the level of unrelated diversification, suggesting that economies of scope for IT investment and complementary value from enabling coordination and control in unrelated diversification, if present at all, may be negligible.
Our findings hold implications for management research and practice. Prior research has noted that diversified firms invest more in IT (Dewan et al. 1998 ). Our findings help infer when greater IT investment in diversification is justified and can thereby guide managers in their IT investment decisions. Increasing IT investment to accompany a firm's overall diversification, our findings suggest, may be justified by the greater performance impact of such investments. Our findings also suggest that the type of diversification pursued will be relevant in justifying increased IT investment. Specifically, whereas greater IT investment to accompany diversification across related businesses can be justified by the greater performance impact of IT, greater IT investment to accompany diversification across unrelated businesses cannot be similarly justified. To scholars and policy makers interested in the economic impact of IT, our findings, together with the continued dominance of diversified firms in the economy and the decline of unrelated diversification among the largest U.S. firms (Davis et al. 1994) , suggest that the overall economic impact of corporate IT investments is likely to be positive.
Limitations of our study are as follows. First, our measure of IT investment was based on budgets and not actual spending. Although many prior studies have used budgeted figures for investments, this is a limitation that future research could address. Second, although the measures of related diversification used in this study have been used extensively, they rely on an SIC classification system, which may not indicate all of the ways in which businesses may be related (Markides and Williamson 1996) . Finally, firms in the study were those for which IT investment data were available from Information Week. Although a significant body of IT literature has been established using these data, generalizability of these findings to other firms is open to scrutiny.
There are many useful directions for further research. We discuss two of them here. First, further research could shed light on whether certain types of IT systems provide better coordination capability in diversified firms than others. It would also be useful to investigate whether sharing and transferring certain types of IT assets across businesses creates a greater performance effect than others. Second, there is growing interest in multipoint competition, where a diversified firm initiates action in one business to affect competitive outcomes in another business (Gimeno 1999) . Multipoint competition requires sophisticated systems to supply information necessary to make decisions in one business based on competitive situations in another. It will be useful to study the information system profiles of successful multipoint competitors, as these firms could offer case studies of advanced information technology use in support of agility and entrepreneurial action (Sambamurthy et al. 2003) within diversified firms.
Industry capital intensity = C i P i , where C i = average capital intensity for industry i (measured as total assets/ sales) and P i = proportion of firm's sales in industry i. Data source: Compustat. Prior studies: Bharadwaj et al. (1999) and Capon et al. (1990) .
Industry concentration = CR4 i P i , where CR4 i = four-firm concentration ratio for industry i and P i = proportion of firm's sales in industry i. Data sources: Census Bureau and Compustat. Prior studies: Bharadwaj et al. (1999) .
Market uncertainty = U i P i , where U i = volatility of industry i's sales and P i = proportion of firm's sales in industry i. Volatility of industry sales was measured using the approach suggested by Bergh (1998) and Keats and Hitt (1988) using industry sales data for the five year period 1991 to 1996. Data sources: Industry sales data from the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis; Proportion of firm sales in each industry from Compustat. Prior studies: Bergh (1998) and Keats and Hitt (1988) .
Market growth = G i P i , where G i = industry i's sales growth and P i = proportion of firm's sales in industry i. Industry sales growth was measured using the approach suggested by Bergh (1998) and Keats and Hitt (1988) using industry sales data for the five year period from 1991 to 1996. Data sources and prior studies are the same as for market uncertainty.
Firm-Level Control Variables
Firm size: Firm size is measured as log (sales). Market share = MS i P i , where MS i = market share of the firm in industry i and P i = proportion of firm's sales in industry i. Data sources: Industry sales data from the Census Bureau; Firm sales in industry and proportion of firm sales in industry from Compustat. Prior studies: Bharadwaj et al. (1999) .
Capital structure: Measured as the ratio of total liabilities to sales. Data source: Compustat. Prior studies: Hitt et al. (1997) .
R&D intensity: Measured as the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. Data source: Compustat. Prior studies: Bharadwaj et al. (1999) .
Advertising intensity: Measured as the ratio of advertising expenditures to sales. Data source: Compustat. Prior studies: Bharadwaj et al. (1999) .
